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Commercial space companies will soon be the primary method of launching people and 
supplies into orbit. Among the critical aspects of space launches are the meteorological 
concerns. Laws and regulations pertaining to meteorological considerations have been 
created to ensure the safety of the space industry and those living around spaceports; but, 
are they adequate? Perhaps the commercial space industry can turn to the commercial 
aviation industry to help answer that question. Throughout its history, the aviation 
industry has dealt with lessons learned from mishaps due to failures in understanding the 
significance of weather impacts on operations. Using lessons from the aviation industry, 
the commercial space industry can preempt such accidents and maintain viability as an 
industry. Using Lanicci’s Strategic Planning Model, this study identified the weather 
needs of the commercial space industry by conducting three gap analyses. First, a 
comparative analysis was done between laws and regulations in commercial aviation and 
those in the commercial space industry pertaining to meteorological support, finding a 
“legislative gap” between the two industries, as no legal guarantee is in place to ensure 
weather products remain available to the commercial space industry. A second analysis 
was conducted between the meteorological services provided for the commercial aviation 
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industry and commercial space industry, finding a gap at facilities not located at an 
established launch facility or airport. At such facilities, many weather observational 
technologies would not be present, and would need to be purchased by the company 
operating the spaceport facility. A third analysis was conducted between the 
meteorological products and regulations that are currently in existence, and those needed 
for safe operations within the commercial space industry, finding gaps in predicting 
lightning, electric field charge, and space weather. Recommendations to address these 
deficiencies have been generated for the Federal Aviation Administration, U.S. Congress, 
commercial space launch companies, and areas are identified for further research. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
 For the first 50 years of space launches in the US, the Federal Government 
dominated the industry. With the conclusion of the Space Transportation System (Space 
Shuttle) and the cancelation of the Constellation program, the commercial spaceflight 
industry will soon become the prominent contributor to low-Earth orbit (LEO) space 
operations within the US (Office of Science and Technology Policy & National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration [NASA], 2010).  While scientists and engineers 
who have worked for the federal government may transition into the private sector, there 
is expected to be a learning curve as new untested rockets are developed, as seen with 
early launches by the commercial company, Space Exploration Technologies (SpaceX) 
(SpaceX, 2012). During this transition, many issues must to be scrutinized to ensure the 
safe operation of both manned and unmanned flight activities.  
 Among the issues facing new space launch companies, weather safety will be one 
of the most important. Weather safety has significantly impacted operations of past space 
launches, both in the US and abroad (Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle 
Challenger Accident, 1986; Uman & Rakov, 2003). The commercial aviation industry 
had a similar experience in its early days, with weather causing the majority of accidents 
(Allaz, 1998). This study examined the commercial aviation industry for weather-safety 
lessons learned that can be adopted by the commercial space industry to assist in the 
prevention of costly accidents that could set the commercial space industry back during a 
crucial period in its development. 
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Significance of the Study 
This study was used to help determine the implications of proper meteorological 
support for the operations of the commercial space industry. For the commercial space 
industry to expand, high investor confidence must exist. Without large amounts of 
investment capital and public support, the entire industry could falter prior to becoming 
self-sufficient, as the airline industry almost experienced prior to becoming nearly self-
sufficient. Public and investor confidence is built through a successful record of launches, 
minimal ground or airborne accidents, and no loss of life. The recommendations of this 
study seek to clarify safety concerns regarding proper meteorological support to help 
provide stability for the commercial space industry. 
Ultimately, this study could make recommendations to the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) for revising the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) to cover the 
meteorological considerations of the commercial space industry. It also could provide a 
recommended amendment to U.S. Code, entitled National and Commercial Space 
Programs (2010), to expand the mandate of the National Weather Service (NWS) to 
include commercial space operations in its aviation obligations. Recommendations, based 
upon the results of this study, could also be made to individual launch operators and 
weather support personnel to adapt their “launch commit criteria” to ensure that 
comprehensive operational meteorological procedures exist for all weather considerations 
of orbital missions. 
Statement of the Problem 
 As the airline industry expanded, regulation was slow to follow, often spurred by 
accidents that cost lives and caught the public’s attention (Bailey, 2002). Accidents, 
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caused in large part due to the lack of regulation prior to the Air Commerce Act of 1926 
and the introduction of the Civil Aeronautics Authority in 1938, caused public reluctance 
to fly due to the industry’s unreliable safety record (Bilstein, 2001). It was at this time in 
aviation that meteorological regulations were created to provide necessary limits on the 
aviation industry that could not be bypassed except in emergencies. These regulations 
included specific takeoff and landing minima, rules for flying in and around clouds, rules 
for flying around thunderstorms, and many others.  
 The development of the commercial space industry is now underway, mirroring 
many of the challenges and hurdles encountered by the development and expansion of 
commercial aviation in the first half of the 20
th
 century. Without appropriate preemptive 
regulation, the commercial space industry could undergo significant setbacks, in both 
financial and investor confidence, which could devastate the development of the industry 
as a whole. 
 It is hypothesized that there is a disparity in overarching regulations that exist 
between the commercial space industry and commercial airline industry concerning 
meteorological support. The meteorological regulations in place for the commercial space 
industry are not as comprehensive as those for the aviation industry (Aviation Programs, 
2012; National and Commercial Space Programs, 2010). It is also hypothesized that the 
current meteorological regulations do not meet the requirements needed for the safe 
expansion of the commercial space industry. Due to the significantly higher costs of 
spaceflight ventures, comprehensive meteorological safety regulations should be in place 
prior to the significant expansion of spaceflight activities. Regulatory inequities between 
meteorological services provided to the aviation industry and those provided to the 
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commercial space industry must be bridged. If investments are made for preventive 
regulation and safe operations, the development of the commercial space industry will be 
enhanced significantly. With the appropriate regulations in place, the industry can forego 
repeating the mistakes of the early aviation industry. 
Purpose Statement 
 The purpose of this study was to identify the gaps between the aviation and the 
commercial space industries regarding meteorological regulations, services, and products 
in order to estimate the meteorological data and analyze requirements of the commercial 
space industry. This evaluation was accomplished by analyzing the services offered by 
the NWS Aviation Weather Center (AWC), applicable to the commercial space industry, 
as well as support provided by the 45
th
 Weather Squadron of the U.S. Air Force for space 
launches at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS) and NASA Kennedy Space 
Center (KSC).  
Research Questions 
 Q1: Does a gap exist in meteorological regulations between the commercial 
aviation industry and the commercial space industry? 
 Q2: Does a gap exist between meteorological services provided for commercial 
aviation companies and airports and meteorological services provided for commercial 
space companies and spaceports? 
 Q3: Does the meteorological products and regulations for the commercial space 
industry meet the estimated needs of commercial space operators? 
Delimitations 
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 The data on current meteorological considerations of the commercial space 
industry were based upon research performed on past space launch ventures, both public 
and commercial. The review examples may not accurately represent the needs and 
requirements of every company, since there are too many companies developing launch 
and flight vehicles to adequately cover each type of vehicle. Designs were selected based 
upon the current trend of commercial launch programs in the US. For the purposes of this 
study, needs  of commercial space operators were restricted to the near future (i.e., next 
10 years) . This is to better compare operations to early aviation. Additionally, operations 
discussed in this study were limited to launch operations.  
Limitations and Assumptions 
 Due to the sensitive and competitive nature of commercial space companies, 
companies were not willing to provide their meteorological data requirements. Therefore, 
approximations were made to best fit the requirements, based upon historical 
requirements. These approximations were made based upon current research and account 
for weather sensitivities experienced by companies in the past, or requirements derived 
from spacecraft design. Many methods exist to measure the weather phenomena 
described in this study. An analysis of each would have overshadowed other important 
factors of this study. Therefore, only commonly used methods of observing these weather 
phenomena were discussed.  
Definitions of Terms 
Cloud Ceiling: The lowest layer of clouds reported as broken or overcast, or over 
50% sky cover (FAA, 2010) 
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Meteorology Regulations: Federal regulations pertaining to meteorological 
phenomena, technology, operations, and safety in the chapter 
entitled Commercial Space Transportation (2012), the sections 
entitled General Operating and Flight Rules (2012) and Operating 
Requirements: Domestic, Flag, and Supplemental Operations 
(2012) in the CFR, and U.S. Code under National and Commercial 
Space Programs (2010). 
Launch Operator: The holder of a Launch Operator license, as defined by federal 
regulation in Types of Launch Licenses (2011). A holder is 
authorized to conduct launches from one launch site using a single 
family of vehicles with a specified type of payload, per license. 
Launch Overpressure: Loads placed on a rocket by the initial engine exhaust 
interacting with the launch pad and launch pad ductwork (Troclet, 
Alestra, Terrasse, Jeanjean, & Srithammavanh, 2005). 
Launch Site Operator: The holder of a license to operate a launch site under 
federal regulations in License to Operate a Launch Site (2011). 
Mean Sea Level: The average level of the surface of the sea between high and low 
water (Sea level, 2011). 
Triboelectrification: The generation of an electrical charge caused by friction, 
used in this study, between the launch vehicle and ice particles 
(Natural and Triggered Lightning Flight Commit Criteria, 2011). 
List of Acronyms 
ACA Accuracy to Cost Analysis 
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AIM Aeronautical Information Manual 
ASOS Automated Surface Observing System 
AST FAA Office of Commercial Space Transportation 
ATIS Automatic Terminal Information Service 
AWC Aviation Weather Center 
AWOS Automated Weather Observing System 
CAA Civil Aviation Authority 
CFR Code of Federal Regulations 
CCAFS Cape Canaveral Air Force Station 
CIP Current Icing Product 
CME Coronal Mass Ejection 
CST Commercial Space Transportation 
DOT Department of Transportation 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FSS Flight Service Station 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization 
IFR Instrument Flight Rules 
JAXA Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency 
KSC Kennedy Space Center 
LEO Low-Earth Orbit 
LLWAS Low Level Windshear Alert System 
LSO Launch Site Operator 
METAR Meteorological Aerodrome Report 
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MSL Mean Sea Level 
NLDN National Lightning Detection Network 
NWS National Weather Service 
OV Orbital Vehicle 
PIREP Pilot Weather Report 
SEP Solar Energetic Particles 
SpaceX Space Exploration Technologies Corporation 
SRB Solid Rocket Booster 
STS Space Transportation System 
TAF Aerodrome Forecast 
TIBS Telephone Information Briefing Service 
TOA Time of Arrival  
TWA Trans Western Airlines  
 USPLN United States Precision Lightning Network 
VFR  Visual Flight Rules  
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Chapter II 
Review of the Relevant Literature 
History of Meteorology in the Aviation Industry 
Anyone who has ever been stuck in an airport because a flight was delayed or 
canceled due to weather can respect the importance of weather to the aviation industry. 
Weather played an important role in many early aviation accidents. Early commercial 
aviation exploits in the United States were largely backed by air mail contracts from the 
U.S. Post Office (Allaz, 1998). Prior to 1930, airlines received contracts to deliver the 
mail based on the weight of mail bags. This led to smaller aircraft being developed, rather 
than the larger passenger aircraft. The Waters Act of 1930 altered contract rates to an 
amount governed by the available capacity of the aircraft, not the weight of the mail 
being provided (Allaz, 1998). This sparked the development and use of larger aircraft and 
led to airlines seeking passengers as a means of expanding revenue for flights. To attract 
passengers, however, the safety record and comfort level of the population needed to be 
improved (Allaz, 1998).  
Between 1920 and 1927, airmail pilots were forced to land 6,469 times, or an 
average of once for every 2,380 miles flown (Allaz, 1998). Over that time, the cause of 
forced landings shifted from 46% mechanical and 54% weather-related to 14% 
mechanical and 86% weather-related, as forced landings increased from just over 300 a 
year to just over 1,000 a year (Allaz, 1998). This increase was consistent with an increase 
in traffic, though often the public was only cognizant of the number of accident, rather 
than the percentage of accidents (Meisinger, 1920). A significant spike in accidents was 
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noted in 1921 due to the introduction of night flights prior to the advent of lighted 
airways (Allaz, 1998).   
Many early airline operators had false impressions about weather on air routes. 
Airline operators would fly a route less than a dozen times and use the interpretation of 
the weather conditions, such as winds, turbulence, cloud cover, and fog, as an indication 
of whether the weather conditions would be appropriate to fly a route. In a time when 
meteorologists did not truly understand many aspects of the atmosphere, airline operators 
were making weather generalizations that inevitably would lead to the deaths of pilots 
and the loss of cargo (Meisinger, 1920). Meisinger further identified the damage that 
weather-related accidents did to the public image of aviation, citing it as a hazard to the 
overall growth of the aviation industry.  
Werrell (2010) also highlighted the negative impact weather had on aviation, 
particularly on the U.S. Army Air Corps’ handling of the air mail in 1934. He cited a 
particularly poor winter weather season and the lack of appropriate meteorological 
training and instrumentation as a leading cause in the skyrocketing death-rate of airmail 
pilots, from an average of 12.4 in 1933 to 10 deaths within the first month of 1934. 
Weather-ignorant pilots would make mistakes, flying into weather conditions well 
beyond their skills, such as heavy snowstorms in the winter and thunderstorms in the 
summer. Newspapers of the day covered every crash closely, casting a shadow of doubt 
on aviation as a successful mode of transportation, intentionally or otherwise (Associated 
Press, 1928; United Press, 1934). One particular accident hit close to home for legislators 
in Washington D.C., forcing the issue of the need for regulation (Bailey, 2002). A Trans 
Western Airline (TWA) Douglas DC-2 ran out of fuel and crashed while trying to find a 
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path through fog on May 6, 1935. Among the casualties was United States Senator 
Bronson Cutting of New Mexico, a very well-liked Senator (Associated Press, 1935). The 
result was the formation of the Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA) in 1938, which finally 
created a body responsible for enforcing safety in aviation (Bailey, 2002).  
The CAA had the authority to create regulations pertaining to any aspects 
affecting the safety of aviation, including the first regulations covering weather. While 
the CAA tailored meteorological regulations to commercial aviation, the Civil 
Aeronautics Act of 1938 also changed the mandate on the Weather Bureau, the 
predecessor of the NWS, to include specific requirements pertaining to aviation. Included 
were instructions to create offices and weather stations needed to support aviation and to 
provide current reports, forecasts, and warnings to air carriers and other civil operations, 
including private operations (Civil Aeronautics Act, 1938). Though the technology and 
procedures have been updated, the language of this code has been maintained and the 
basic responsibilities are still in place. The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 expanded the 
required operations to include the necessary standards to meet international aviation 
meteorology requirements and to transfer oversight responsibility for the Weather Bureau 
from the Department of Agriculture to the Department of Commerce (Federal Aviation 
Act, 1958). 
Despite the implementation of the Civil Aeronautics Act, aircraft accidents due to 
adverse weather conditions persisted. At times, the FAA, the descendent of the CAA, has 
been unable to foresee the necessary technology or procedures to prevent the loss of life 
through weather-related accidents. One notable example is the development of the Low-
Level Windshear Alert System (LLWAS) following the crash of Eastern Airlines Flight 
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66 in 1975 (Meyer, Isaminger, & Proseus, 1999). The Boeing 727 was attempting to 
make an approach into New York’s John F. Kennedy International Airport too close to a 
thunderstorm. Flight 66 was caught in windshear and struck the approach lighting system 
just short of the runway (National Transportation Safety Board, 1976). The original 
LLWAS system consisted of six wind sensors, one at the center of the airfield and five 
spread around the outskirts of the field. When another fatal accident caused by windshear 
occurred, Delta Air Lines Flight 191 into Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport in 
1985, an update to the system was made to reduce the false-alarm rate and the 
development of windshear alerting systems onboard aircraft to identify rapid changes in 
wind speed or direction (Meyer et al., 1999).   
Aviation-related meteorology CFRs. Due to accidents such as those described 
above, a variety of all-encompassing regulations has been established to prevent weather-
related accidents from occurring. These requirements can be drawn from three primary 
locations: 14 CFR Part 91: Air Traffic General Operating and Flight Rules (2012), 14 
CFR Part 121: Operating Requirements: Domestic, Flag, and Supplemental Operations 
(2012), and the Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) (FAA, 2012). 
14 CFR Part 91: Air Traffic General Operating Rules. The Air Traffic General 
Operating Rules (2012) contain the primary source for meteorological regulation for all 
of aviation. These rules cover all private and commercial of flight, from general aviation 
aircraft, to wide-bodied commercial transport aircraft. Meteorological requirements are 
divided into two categories: Visual flight rules (VFR) and Instrument flight rules (IFR) 
(FAA, 2012). 
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VFR flight describes flight for any aircraft not flying within clouds, obscurations 
to visibility, or precipitation (FAA, 2012). The CFR has very specific requirements for  
aircraft flying around clouds and in situations where visibility is restricted. Table 1 lists 
the visibility and cloud clearance minimums for VFR traffic in different airspaces. Class 
A airspace, located at or above 18,000 feet above mean sea level (MSL), is not included 
since VFR flight is not permitted in Class A airspace (Basic VFR Weather Minimums, 
2004). Though complicated, this system provides specific restrictions to flight traffic in 
areas of different types of air traffic. Specifically, Class D through B airspaces surround 
airports with increasing levels of traffic from Class D to Class B (FAA, 2012).  
For flight within clouds or any other obscuration, aircraft are controlled under 
IFR. Aircraft must be certified with additional equipment, and pilots must undergo 
additional training to fly in instrument conditions. In addition, to perform an instrument 
approach into an airport, approach equipment must be provided at the airport and 
approach procedures must be in place (Takeoff and Landing Under IFR, 2009). Because 
of these requirements, the general operating rules for flying in IFR conditions are much 
more stringent but less complicated than VFR rules. The primary consideration in IFR is 
the ability to safely takeoff and land an aircraft. To take off, the visibility must be above a 
half statute mile for aircraft operating with two engines and one mile for aircraft 
operating with one engine, unless the airport has minimum takeoff conditions listed. In 
that case, takeoff conditions must be above the minimum takeoff conditions listed in the 
instrument procedures for the airport (Takeoff and Landing Under IFR, 2009). 
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Table 1  
Basic VFR Weather Minimums for Aviation.  
Airspace Flight Visibility Distance from clouds 
Class B 3 Statute Miles Clear of Clouds 
Class C 3 Statute Miles 
500ft below, 1,000 ft. 
above, and 2000ft. 
horizontally 
Class D 3 Statute Miles 
500ft below, 1,000 ft. 
above, and 2000ft. 
horizontally 
Class E: Less than 10,000 
ft. MSL 
3 Statute Miles 
500ft below, 1,000 ft. 
above, and 2000ft. 
horizontally 
Class E: At or above 10,000 
ft. MSL 
5 Statute Miles 
1,000 ft. below and above, 1 
Statute Mile horizontally 
Class G: 1,200 ft. or less 
above the surface (Daytime) 
1 Statute Mile Clear of Clouds 
Class G: 1,200 ft. or less 
above the surface 
(Nighttime) 
3 Statute Miles 
500ft below, 1,000 ft. 
above, and 2000ft. 
horizontally 
Class G: More than 1,200 ft. 
above the surface but less 
than 10,000 ft. MSL 
(Daytime) 
1 Statute Mile 
500ft below, 1,000 ft. 
above, and 2000ft. 
horizontally 
Class G: More than 1,200 ft. 
above the surface but less 
than 10,000 ft. MSL 
(Nighttime) 
3 Statute Miles 
500ft below, 1,000 ft. 
above, and 2000ft. 
horizontally 
Class G: More than 1,200 ft. 
above the surface 
5 Statute Miles 
1,000 ft. below and above, 1 
Statute Mile horizontally 
Flight below controlled 
airspace and less than    
10,000 ft.  with special 
clearance (Special VFR) 
1 Statute Mile Clear of Clouds 
Note. From Basic VFR Weather Minimums (2004). 
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14 CFR Part 121: Operating Requirements: Domestic, Flag, and Supplemental 
Operations.  The Operating Requirements for Domestic, Flag and Supplemental 
Operations (2012) provide additional requirements on meteorological considerations for 
operators for compensation or hire that must be followed in addition to the General 
Operating and Flight Rules. There are five primary sections within this part of the CFR 
that directly concern weather. For comparison purposes, only regulations concerning 
takeoff and enroute flight will be examined. 
The Operating Requirements: Domestic, Flag and Supplemental Operations states 
that an aircraft cannot be dispatched for flight unless the person dispatching the aircraft is 
“thoroughly familiar” with the reported and forecasted conditions for the route of the 
flight. While the definition of “thoroughly familiar” is not clearly stated or defined, this 
requirement is used to ensure that no aircraft can take off without an approved staff 
member of the airline reviewing the relevant meteorological data pertaining to the 
specific flight (Familiarity with Weather Conditions, 1996). These regulations also 
require an operator to prove it has a method for “obtaining, maintaining and distributing” 
weather data, specifically prevailing wind conditions when visibility is restricted. This 
ensures that in times of adverse weather, pilots have access to the general direction of the 
wind to ensure the safety of the flight and the use of a proper takeoff or landing heading 
(Airports: Required Data, 2007). 
The Operating Requirements (2012) also cover additional takeoff minima for 
operations in VFR. In addition to the requirements imposed by the general operating rules 
discussed above, domestic and international flights for compensation or hire must meet 
stricter requirements for taking-off. An aircraft in Class G airspace may be able to take 
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off with clouds making up greater than 50% of the sky, commonly referred to as a 
ceiling, with clouds in the hundreds of feet above the surface, as long as the aircraft 
remains clear of the clouds. A commercial aircraft in that same airspace must ensure at 
least a 1,000 foot ceiling prior to taking off, as well as one statute mile visibility during 
the day, and 2 statute miles of visibility at night. The visibility requirement can be 
reduced to a half mile if the obstruction is located at the surface and all of the flight 
beyond one mile of the airport boundary can be made outside of the obscuration (Takeoff 
and Landing Minimums: VFR: Domestic Operations, 1991). Additionally, this part of the 
federal regulations covers takeoff minimums for IFR operations specific to commercial 
carriers. This section provides some leniency in the IFR takeoff minimums established in 
the general rules. As the aircraft operated by commercial carriers have more advanced 
and more precise equipment, the holder of a commercial certificate may get specific 
approval in their operations specifications to takeoff in conditions lower than those in the 
general rules (Takeoff and Landing Minimums: IFR: All Certificate Holders, 2007). 
Finally, a low-altitude windshear system with approved flight guidance, or a 
similar system capable of detecting and providing avoidance messages, must be equipped 
on all aircraft built after 1991 (Low-altitude Windshear System Equipment 
Requirements, 1990). Systems like these significantly improve the safety of the public on 
commercial flights. 
Aeronautical Information Manual. The AIM (FAA, 2012) provides the 
fundamental elements required to fly within the United States airspace. The information 
ranges from navigational aids and airport markings, to air traffic control and 
meteorology. While this document contains information covered in other sections, such 
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as weather minima for VFR flight covered in the Air Traffic General Operating Rules 
(2012) of the CFR, this section will focus on information that does not appear in either 
Air Traffic General Operating Rules or Operating Requirements: Domestic, Flag and 
Supplemental Operations. 
Presently, the dissemination of weather information is the joint responsibility of 
the FAA and the NWS. Many of the products used by aviation come from the NWS, and 
the NWS is responsible for approximately one quarter of the surface weather observing 
equipment at civilian airports across the country (FAA, 2012). The NWS and the FAA 
are both responsible for creating the products required by the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO), such as Meteorological Aerodrome Reports (METAR) (FAA, 
2012).  
By law, the NWS is responsible for creating products to ensure the safety of 
aviation, including Inflight Advisories, Significant Meteorological Information 
(SIGMETs), Convective SIGMETS, Airman’s Meteorological Information (AIRMETs) 
and Area Forecasts (FAA, 2012). These products provide information on areas of weather 
conditions that could be a potential hazard to aviation. Hazards advised in these products 
include thunderstorms, icing, turbulence, dust or sandstorms, volcanic ash, tornadoes, 
IFR conditions and hail.  The NWS also provides information on the winds aloft from the 
Service’s network of upper air measurements through the use of weather balloons 
carrying instrument packages known as radiosondes, launched twice daily. The NWS 
network of weather radars across the country provides for preflight weather planning, 
among its many other uses. The radar sites can provide locations of light to heavy 
precipitation, as well as wind conditions inside a storm. The FAA operates smaller radar 
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sites to cover specific airports with higher resolution, typically in areas with heavy air 
traffic. Weather products to be used for flight planning purposes are specified explicitly 
by the FAA. Primary products are approved for use in flight planning, while 
supplementary products, which may be experimental or less accurate, may be used in 
conjunction with primary products in flight planning (FAA, 2012).  
Combined with data from the FAA, private contractors, and supplemental 
observers, the NWS provides hourly surface observation data from equipment owned by 
the FAA or the NWS (FAA, 2012). Currently, these two agencies primarily use either the 
Automated Weather Observing Systems (AWOS) or Automated Surface Observing 
Systems (ASOS) for surface reports. These systems observe visibility between ¼ mile 
and 10 statute miles; sensible weather, including precipitation and/or surface obscuration; 
cloud ceiling and sky cover; air temperature and dew point; altimeter setting in inches of 
mercury, representing surface pressure; and any additional information that may be useful 
for aviation operations or forecasting future conditions. METARs are derived from these 
systems hourly, often automatically. If conditions are rapidly changing, or the boundary 
between IFR and VFR is being crossed during that hour, special METARs will be issued. 
In addition to METARs, the ICAO requires Aerodrome Forecasts (TAF) to be produced, 
which provides forecasted conditions within a 5-statue mile radius of the aerodrome for 
between 24 and 30 hours in the future. TAFs are products produced every 6 hours by the 
NWS, to provide forecasted weather conditions for many of the same measurement 
parameters recorded in METARs, including winds, visibility, cloud cover and ceiling, 
and sensible weather (FAA, 2012).  
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The FAA also provides weather support for aviation. Presently, the FAA contracts 
to maintain a nationwide network of Flight Service Stations (FSS) (FAA, 2012). These 
stations, which can be either staffed or automated, provide different briefings based upon 
the flight needs of a pilot. These briefings can be accessed by radio or telephone through 
the use of the Telephone Information Briefing Service (TIBS). Air traffic controllers can 
also issue weather avoidance assistance when radio communication traffic is not too high. 
Though less accurate than NWS radar reports, these are available for pilots in-flight, and 
relative position between an aircraft and radar reflectivity echoes can be established 
relatively easily. Controllers are also required to request reports from pilots in certain 
conditions. These pilot weather reports (PIREPs) are voluntary, but provide confirmation 
of weather conditions when SIGMETs and AIRMETs are indicated (FAA, 2012). 
Flying around thunderstorms can be particularly hazardous. Thunderstorms can 
produce turbulence, hail, rain, snow, lightning, updrafts, downdrafts, and icing 
conditions, and can affect an area 20 miles around the clouds producing the storm. Flight 
within, underneath, or within a 20-mile radius of a thunderstorm is considered to be 
hazardous, and is highly discouraged to ensure the safety of a flight (FAA, 2012).  
History of Weather Impacts on the Space Industry  
Lack of proper understanding of meteorological requirements has led to costly 
accidents in the space launch industry, both in fiscal terms and human life. While many 
space launch accidents have occurred, for the purposes of this study, three notable 
historical examples in which weather played a major role will be discussed: the Space 
Shuttle Challenger accident (Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger 
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Accident, 1986), the loss of the NOZOMI probe (Yoshikawa et al., 2005), and the 
Atlas/Centaur 67 rocket accident (Christian et al., 1989).  
Space Shuttle Challenger. Challenger, designated as Operational Vehicle (OV)-
099, was the second operational Space Shuttle Orbiter created for the Space 
Transportation System (STS) program, first flying in 1983 (Presidential Commission on 
the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, 1986). Challenger made its last launch on January 
28, 1986, on the scheduled mission STS-51-L. The cause of the accident was the failure 
of two O-rings at one joint on the Space Shuttle’s Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB) during 
launch. The failure of these O-rings to maintain a seal allowed hot gas to escape the SRB 
joint, burning a hole in the External Tank, and igniting the fuel inside. The mount holding 
the SRB to the External Tank failed, causing the upper portion of the SRB to breach the 
upper portion of the External Tank. The rupturing tank and forces caused by the failing 
SRB caused Challenger to break apart over the Atlantic Ocean, 73 seconds after ignition, 
killing all seven astronauts on board including a civilian teacher (Presidential 
Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, 1986). The launch configuration 
of a Space Shuttle is shown in Figure 1.  
The O-rings that failed were located in the joint of the SRB. As seen in Figure 2, 
two O-rings are located at each joint of the SRB, a primary O-ring and a secondary O- 
ring. The primary O-ring was designed to contain all of the heat and pressure of 
combustion as the zinc chromate putty is burned away. However, the secondary O-ring 
was designed to contain the heat and pressure fully, should the primary O-ring fail 
(Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, 1986). On a prior 
Shuttle launch, STS-51-C the year prior, the primary O-ring had failed, but the mission  
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Figure 1. Space Shuttle Configuration, showing the Orbiter and the two SRBs attached to 
the External Tank in the center. Note. Adapted from Presidential Commission on the 
Space Shuttle Challenger Accident (1986). 
 
 
 
was saved due to the proper operation of the secondary O-ring. This was evident on the 
return of the booster after inspection, as soot was found between the primary and 
secondary O-rings. The temperature at launch time for STS-51-C was 53 degrees 
Fahrenheit, the coldest launch temperature at the time. For STS-51-L, the temperature at 
launch was approximately 31 degrees Fahrenheit, and had been even colder the day prior. 
Contractors from Thiokol, the company that designed and built the SRBs, admitted in a 
meeting the day prior that they had concerns over the temperatures, but were pressured 
into giving launch approval due to the heightened demand to launch after a series of 
unrelated delays in days prior (Lighthall, 1991). The cold had decreased the integrity and 
flexibility of these O-rings and, combined with the strongest variation of winds aloft of 
any prior launch, the O-rings failed (Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle 
Challenger Accident, 1986).  One aspect that made this disaster even more damaging to  
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Figure 2. An artist's representation of one of the four joints in each of the Space Shuttle's 
SRBs.  Note. The two O-rings are boxed in red; Adapted from Presidential Commission 
on the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster (1986). 
 
 
the image of manned spaceflight was the presence of Christa McAuliffe, the first member 
of Teachers in Space to be scheduled for launch. This caused extensive media coverage, 
and news of the accident spread rapidly (Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle 
Accident, 1986). 
NOZOMI space probe. The Mars Explorer “NOZOMI” was a space probe 
developed by the Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) as their first 
spacecraft to be sent to Mars (Yoshikawa et al., 2005). The probe was designed to study 
the upper atmosphere of Mars, including the interactions of the solar winds with the 
planet. Shortly after launch, the craft attempted to perform a maneuver to build up speed 
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by passing close to Earth to use its gravitational pull to accelerate, a maneuver known as 
a gravity assist. During this gravity assist, a failure occurred in the system providing the 
fuel to the engine, and the acceleration was much less than planned. In order to continue 
the mission, a series of gravity assists were used, which significantly increased the time 
the probe would be in orbit around the Sun. During this time, NOZOMI was damaged by 
the after-effects of a solar flare, disabling its power supply due to a short circuit in one of 
the subsystems. This caused significant problems, including a failure of telemetry 
communications and a failure to keep the fuel at a temperature above freezing. 
Ultimately, the research team at JAXA was unable to revive NOZOMI fully, and the 
probe was unable to enter Martian orbit. It is currently drifting in space in orbit around 
the Sun (Yoshikawa et al., 2005). 
Atlas Centaur 67. In 1987, the Atlas family of rockets had been used in the US 
space program for 30 years, and to this day remains the oldest family of American 
rockets currently flying (Walker & Powell, 2005). Weather conditions for the March 26 
launch date included cloud cover over Cape Canaveral, with a very slow moving cold 
front and squall line over the Florida panhandle extending into the Gulf of Mexico 
(Christian et al., 1989). This system was creating cloud-to-ground lightning in the area, 
but not within five nautical miles of the launch site within 42 minutes of the launch time, 
nor had there been a single strike within 10 miles over the same time period. However, 
the Atlas/Centaur rocket was struck by lightning 49 seconds following the launch, 
causing a memory upset in the guidance-control electronics of the rocket, resulting in an 
unplanned rotation. This rotation caused the rocket to overstress and it broke apart over 
the Atlantic Ocean (Uman & Rakov, 2003). The subsequent investigation of the accident 
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determined that a strong negative charge had built up over Cape Canaveral, detected by 
the ground-based network of electrically sensitive instruments, known as field mills, 
installed around KSC and CCAFS. This data, combined with other meteorological data 
collected throughout the day, indicated that while there was no strong convection 
occurring at the launch site, there was a sufficient electrical field gradient for a strike to 
occur when the rocket was launched. The highly conductive exhaust plume from the 
rocket created a low-resistance path, causing a lightning strike through the rocket 
(Christian et al, 1989; Uman & Rakov, 2003). 
Summary 
Each new industry must overcome challenges in order to thrive; however, costly 
setbacks could inhibit an industry from taking root. The commercial space industry must 
overcome the challenges of operating safely, from launch to landing, and be cognizant of 
adverse weather conditions that could significantly impact their success and the public’s 
perception of the industry as a whole. Understanding the meteorological concerns for a 
typical company can ensure that proper regulation is created to guide these space 
companies to operate safely with respect to weather phenomena. The impact of remaining 
ignorant of adverse weather conditions has been clearly demonstrated by accidents and 
loss of people and equipment by government space agencies such as NASA, the U.S. Air 
Force, and JAXA.  
The commercial aviation industry and federal government have gone through an 
evolution of lessons learned, and as a result, a number of laws and regulations related to 
meteorology have been created that help to ensure the safe operation of aircraft in adverse 
weather conditions. Many of these same types of laws and regulations can be applied to 
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the commercial space industry. If these lessons can be learned without the loss of a 
launch vehicle or human life, the commercial space industry has a much higher chance of 
long-term success.  
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Chapter III 
Methodology 
Research Approach 
An adapted version of a strategic planning model, proposed by Lanicci (2003), 
was used to organize the data used in this study. This model provided information on the 
important phenomenological, technological, and resource considerations necessary to 
analyze the meteorological requirements for safe launch and flight operations by a 
commercial operator. Three gap analyses pertaining to meteorological requirements for 
supporting commercial space operations were conducted using the strategic planning 
model, which are described below.  
The first gap analysis was conducted between meteorological regulations 
pertinent to the commercial aviation industry and the meteorological regulations pertinent 
to the commercial space industry. The analysis identified if any of the areas of the code 
and regulations relating to meteorological concerns of the commercial space industry fall 
below the same standard to which the aviation industry is held. A difference indicated a 
lack of regulatory coverage regarding meteorological concerns for the commercial space 
industry. 
The second gap analysis evaluated the meteorological services provided to 
aviation companies and the meteorological services provided to the commercial space 
launch operators. The analysis was conducted to determine if a difference existed 
between meteorological products and services used to support airlines and other 
commercial aviation operators, and the products and services used to support commercial 
space launch and flight operators. Included in this analysis were the services provided by 
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the U.S. Air Force 45
th
 Weather Squadron for launches from CCAFS. A difference 
indicated a lack of meteorological products and/or services for the commercial space 
industry. 
The final gap analysis was conducted between the products and regulations 
pertaining to the commercial space industry and the products and regulations necessary to 
meet the needs prescribed by the Functional Analysis and Planning section of Lanicci’s 
(2003) Strategic Planning Model. This analysis identified whether sufficient 
meteorological products and regulations existed that could impact the safety of 
commercial space launches. 
Apparatus and materials. The analysis was conducted using an adapted version 
of the Strategic Planning Model created by Lanicci (2003) (henceforth referred to as 
Lanicci’s Strategic Planning Model). It was designed for use by the U.S. Air Force 
Weather Agency following a 10-year period of reconfiguration of the Department of 
Defense. Lanicci’s Strategic Planning Model is divided into three sections: Input, 
Functional Analysis and Planning, and Execution. A pictorial view of this model can be 
seen in Figure 3. 
The first section, Input, describes the needs of the organization. For the U.S. Air 
Force, it was concepts, strategies and doctrine. Lanicci (2003) examined the impact that 
weather and climate had on planning and executing the concepts, strategies, and doctrine 
of the U.S. Air Force and determining which aspects of strategy would be realistic or 
unrealistic due to what is known about impacts of weather and climate on that strategy. 
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Functional Analysis and Planning is the second section of Lanicci’s Strategic 
Planning Model. This section is the core of this model, performing a step-by-step 
analysis of the weather aspects that an organization is sensitive to, identifying the 
resulting deficiencies, defining the technology that is needed to resolve the deficiencies, 
and identifying the resources needed to apply that technology. To facilitate this analysis, 
this section is further divided into three subsections: Phenomenology, Technology, and 
Force Structure. In the Phenomenology subsection, potential meteorological impacts are 
identified and narrowed. Specific issues can be addressed once the aspects that will not 
impact an industry are eliminated and the focus is set to an appropriate level. The second 
subsection, Technology, identifies and describes what is needed to measure and predict 
the phenomena important to the industry. This section is also where phenomena are 
identified to be beyond the reasonable expense or technological capacity for 
measurement. Lanicci (2003) also focused on the ability to observe and predict the effects 
of these phenomena, not just the phenomena themselves. Finally, the Force Structure 
subsection identifies the resources available for acquiring, implementing, or using the 
Figure 3. Lanicci's Strategic Planning Model. Note. From Lanicci, 2003. 
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technology to observe and predict the phenomena and its potential effects. These 
resources include financial, human, legislative, and organizational resources. An analysis 
of this section can identify areas that are currently well-covered as well as areas with 
insufficient resources.  
The analysis includes the relative cost of products over 25 years. These costs are 
bulk estimates based on approximations of technology purchase and installation costs for 
the purposes of evaluating the relative cost-to-benefit of the technology. Based upon 
these estimations, the costs fell into natural categories. The researcher divided the costs 
into the following categories: negligible, low, moderate, high, and very high. Negligible 
costs indicate the minimal expenses needed to acquire data from free online sources, such 
as products from the NWS. Low costs represent estimated expenses of less than $100,000 
a year, moderate costs represent estimated expenses between $100,000 and $1,000,000 a 
year, high costs represent estimated expenses between $1,000,000 and $5,000,000 a year, 
and very high costs represent estimated expenses over $5,000,000 a year. The ACA was 
conducted by comparing the relative accuracy with the relative cost. The comparisons 
were then ranked and sorted to provide the categories used.  
The final section of Lanicci’s Strategic Planning Model is the Execution section. 
In this section, actual operations following implementation of the new capabilities are 
examined and reviewed. The review in this section provides continuous feedback for the 
system to ensure that the lessons learned and shortcomings observed during 
implementation are used to ensure success of future and intermediate iterations.  
For this study, Lanicci’s Strategic Planning Model provided a strong framework 
to identify the needs of the commercial space industry. It also provided significant data 
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that was used to analyze gaps in meteorological regulations, services, and products to 
meet the needs of the commercial space industry. 
Design and procedures.  For this analysis, Lanicci’s Strategic Planning Model 
was adapted to the commercial space industry. Subsections were also adapted for the 
needs of the commercial space industry. Specifically, Input focused on the estimated 
meteorological considerations of the commercial space industry. It identified which 
environmental conditions a company is sensitive to, and what environmental data is 
required to be collected by the current regulations. Additionally, the third section in 
Functional Analysis and Planning was changed from Force Structure in the original 
model to Resource Structure in this study in order to apply the model beyond the military 
aspects, and better identify how commercial organizations can implement technologies 
necessary to ensure safe launches with respect to meteorological conditions. For the 
purposes of this study, the Resource Structure was further divided into technology cost, a 
cost-benefit analysis described as Accuracy-to-Cost Analysis (ACA), non-technical 
company resource requirements, national coverage of the technology, and likelihood of 
national implementation of the technology. The third section, Execution, was not 
discussed, as it would require the actual implementation of the capabilities identified in 
the previous two sections to evaluate adequately; that is beyond the scope of this study. 
Three gap analyses were conducted following the analysis of the adapted version 
of Lanicci’s Strategic Planning Model. The gap analyses used to answer Research 
Questions 1 and 2 were performed by analyzing information acquired through the 
literature review, while the gap analysis used to answer Research Question 3 compared 
the output from the Resource Structure of the Function Analysis and Planning section of 
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the model to the current meteorological products and regulations pertaining to the 
commercial space industry. 
Sources of the Data and Data Collection  
 The majority of the information acquired for this study came from a review of the 
relevant federal codes and regulations, and literature pertaining to the needs of the 
commercial space industry. Meteorological services provided by the U.S. Air Force 45
th
 
Weather Squadron and launch commit criteria at CCAFS were acquired through 
documentation and statements from launch weather officers.  
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Chapter IV 
Results 
 The adapted version of Lanicci’s Strategic Planning Model was applied to the 
commercial space industry. A gap analysis was conducted between regulations for the 
commercial aviation industry and the commercial space industry answering research 
Question 1. Two gap analyses were conducted from the data gathered in the model, 
answering research Questions 2 and 3, covering meteorological services and identifying 
gaps in product and regulatory coverage for the commercial space industry. The results 
are as follows. 
Applying the Model: Input Stage 
Compared to the meteorological regulations of the aviation industry, similar 
regulations for the commercial space launch industry are in their infancy. Currently, 
weather launch requirements come from two primary sources: the Launch Safety (2012) 
section of the CFR, and the procedural documents of the United States Air Force, such as 
those of the 45
th
 Weather Squadron. 
 Current meteorological regulations for the space launch industry. Many of 
the meteorological requirements for commercial space launch have come about in the last 
2 to 6 years. Eight subsections of the Launch Safety (2012) section of the CFR covered 
the primary meteorological regulations pertaining to the private space industry at the time 
of this study.  
 The most substantial and detailed section of the meteorological regulations 
pertaining to the commercial space industry is Appendix G to Launch Safety (2012). This 
appendix, Natural and Triggered Flight Commit Criteria (2011), deals with very specific 
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methods for mitigating lightning strikes, such as those that caused critical damage to 
Atlas/Centaur 67. This section provides highly detailed descriptions of weather and 
launch conditions that could cause a natural or triggered lightning strike to occur on a 
launch vehicle. It also describes the conditions in which an operator is allowed to launch 
a vehicle near any part of a thunderstorm, or around environments where triggered 
lightning can occur, including very specific requirements for appropriate flight paths and 
appropriate launch delay times (Natural and Triggered Lightning Flight Commit Criteria, 
2011).  
 Each operator must adhere to written safety rules that include, among other 
things, identifying applicable weather conditions in which the launch vehicle can carry 
out its mission without having any negative impacts on public safety. These rules must be 
approved by the FAA’s Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST) prior to 
commencing initial launch operations for a company’s first launch. The AST is the 
FAA’s office that deals with all space-related regulations for the US. Included in the rules 
submitted to the AST must be all the conditions stipulated under the Natural and 
Triggered Lightning Flight Commit Criteria (2011). 
 In addition to having these rules in effect, launch operators must have a launch 
readiness review submitted to the AST. This review must contain the written decision to 
continue, based upon all factors that could impact the launch, listed out in the Reviews 
(2006) section of this part of the CFR, including the status of the launch weather 
forecasts. Prior to launch, the AST must be consulted to ensure that the launch is within 
the operator’s written safety rules already approved by the FAA/AST (Reviews, 2006).  
The Launch Safety Officer, a staff member of a Launch Operator in charge of ensuring 
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the safety of the flight, must prove to the AST that the time delay for any hardware 
relaying meteorological data is within the accepted limitations described by the AST 
(Time Delay, 2006).  
   The majority of the remaining meteorological regulations pertaining to the 
commercial space industry deal with specific parameters to ensure the safety of the 
population on the ground rather than the safety of the flight. These include wind 
weighing to ensure an unguided launch vehicle stays on course (Flight Safety Analysis 
Methodologies, 2006), ensuring a launch can be terminated if the rocket guidance fails or 
is unable to correct for another error (Support Systems, 2006), and ensuring overpressure 
blast effects do not impact the general population, which can occur when a launch vehicle 
is ignited and damage persons and buildings (Far Field Blast Overpressure Effects 
Analysis, 2006; Far Field Overpressure Blast Effects Analysis, 2006; Troclet et al., 
2005). 
NASA weather requirements for launch. The Department of Defense has even 
stricter requirements on launch safety when it pertains to weather conditions. For 
launches at KSC and CCAFS, launch weather is covered by the 45
th
 Weather Squadron 
(McNamara, Roeder, & Merceret, 2009). According to the U.S. Air Force Range 
Planning and Operations instruction, hourly weather observations must be taken for 
temperature, visibility, altimeter setting (atmospheric pressure), cloud ceiling, and surface 
and aloft winds in order to ensure that no significant change will occur prior to launch 
(U.S. Air Force, 2011). It also requires all personnel be trained to have adequate 
knowledge of local weather hazards, and the officer-in-charge of the test range must have 
specific training on the weather limitations for each launch and how to obtain and analyze 
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meteorological data to ensure the meteorological limitations of a launch are not exceeded 
(U.S. Air Force, 2011).  
Applying the model: Function Analysis and Planning 
Using literature on the topic, phenomena important to the commercial space 
industry were analyzed using the Functional Analysis and Planning section of Lanicci’s 
Strategic Planning Model. From the Phenomenology section, the technology that is 
commonly used to assess these phenomena was applied, and a review was created to 
analyze the usefulness and cost effectiveness of the technology. After establishing 
relevant technology, the resources needed by a company to use this technology beyond 
the expense of the equipment, including human and support requirements, were 
discussed. Finally, the availability of this equipment from national sources was evaluated, 
and the likelihood of the NWS beginning operations with that technology was reviewed. 
 Phenomenology. Many meteorological conditions can negatively impact the 
safety of a space launch. Kingwell, Shimizu, Narita, Kawabata, & Shimizu (1991) 
assembled a fairly comprehensive list of weather conditions that could affect a successful 
launch. The categories used in their article were: (a) lightning, (b) wind velocity and 
turbulence profile, (c) temperature, (d) high altitude ice or ash clouds, (e) precipitation, 
(f) visibility, (g) cloud ceiling, and (h) supercooled water.  
As seen in the Atlas/Centaur 67 mission, lightning can be devastating to the 
success of a launch (Uman & Rackov, 2003). Lightning can damage electrical systems 
(including the flight termination system), or the structural equipment of a launch vehicle, 
endanger personnel and facilities on the ground, or even cause the destruction of the 
launch vehicle itself (Kingwell et al., 1991). Due to this threat, lightning is also the most 
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critical condition in the current commercial space launch regulations. Two different types 
of lightning are of concern to launches: natural lightning and triggered lightning. Natural 
lightning typically occurs during a thunderstorm to equalize the unbalanced electric 
charge that developed inside the thunderstorm. Triggered lightning can occur when no 
natural lightning has occurred. The cause of triggered lightning is similar to natural 
lightning, an imbalance of electrical charge. The difference comes from the need for a 
conduit for the triggered lightning to flow through, that is, an area where the electrical 
resistance is lower than the atmosphere around it. When a rocket is launched, the vehicle 
and the exhaust plume trailing behind it can provide a path of low-resistance for the 
electrical charge to travel through, thus triggering a lightning strike (Qui et al., 2007).  
Wind and turbulence information is important to launch for a variety of reasons. 
Wind can affect the launch path, dynamic pressures on the launch vehicle during ascent, 
dispersion of debris and the exhaust plume, the safety of crews working on a launch pad, 
and the stability of a rocket while secured on a launch pad. In particular for unguided 
vehicles, proper wind analysis, forecasting, and weighing the accuracy and applicability 
of the observations ensures the launch vehicle remains on its planned flight path. Due to 
the concerns associated with wind conditions, a large portion of the commercial space 
launch regulation is devoted to wind analysis. Other impacts of wind and turbulence on 
launch vehicles include aerodynamic stresses during launch, exterior booster separation 
and recovery, and impacts on the hazardous range of noise and blast damage (Kingwell et 
al., 1991).   
Temperature can pose a large risk for launches, as seen with STS-51-L 
(Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, 1986). Components 
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of a craft may be sensitive to cold or hot temperatures while on the pad and during 
launch. Additionally, super-cold liquid fuel tanks may have a limit on the temperature 
differential that can easily induce ice accumulation. Temperature extremes can also 
significantly impact engine performance, an impact that could cause the payload to fail to 
reach orbit despite the successful operation of the launch vehicle. Additionally, 
temperature could have an impact on corrosion if equipment is sitting on a launch pad for 
an extended period (Kingwell et al., 1991). 
High altitude ice or ash clouds can also damage a rocket during launch. As a 
rocket must accelerate to a high velocity to enter orbit around Earth, even relatively small 
particles in the atmosphere can cause serious damage to a spacecraft. The small ice and 
ash particles can damage thermal tiles and exterior panels of spacecraft during launch and 
can seriously impact the operation of equipment such as antennas that are vital to the 
success of many space launches (Kingwell et al., 1991).  
Precipitation, cloud ceilings, and surface visibility can significantly impact the 
success of a rocket launch. Precipitation and cloud ceilings can both reduce visibility 
prior to and during launch, and any visibility obscurations can inhibit the ability for 
ground personnel to visually track the rocket (Kingwell et al., 1991). This could make it 
difficult for ground personnel to terminate a launch if a failure is occurring, in violation 
of launch safety regulations (Support Systems, 2006).  Visibility can also impact recovery 
operations of external boosters separated during launch. Precipitation, in particular, can 
indicate the presence of other conditions which could be dangerous to the safety of a 
launch, including lightning and high winds (Kingwell et al., 1991). Precipitation also 
includes hail, which can seriously damage a launch vehicle, as it did with the external 
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tank and SRBs of STS-117, which was forced to return to NASA’s Vehicle Assembly 
Building due to damage caused by golf-ball-sized hail (Jones, 2007). 
Supercooled water in the launch path of a rocket can dramatically impact a 
launch. When supercooled water comes in contact with a surface, it freezes in a layer of 
ice. As this layer of ice builds up, it can significantly alter the aerodynamics of a launch 
vehicle. Ice accumulation can cause additional fuel to be spent overcoming the increased 
drag, control surfaces to no longer be able to keep a rocket on its correct path, or even 
cause the pressure build-up in front of a rocket to exceed structural limitations (Kingwell 
et al., 1991).  
One factor not considered by Kingwell et al. (1991) is space weather, an issue that 
is understated by many studies evaluating launch commit criteria. Tretkoff (2010) 
discussed the crucial need for predicting space weather events due to expected increases 
in commercial space travelers. He expressed concerns over varying levels of radiation 
and solar energetic particles, such as those produced by coronal mass ejections (CME). A 
CME is one type of space weather phenomenon that is produced by the Sun during a 
reconfiguration of its corona. A CME represents the expulsion of super-hot coronal 
plasma at high speeds, which streams high-energy particles in the direction of the ejection 
(Lewis & Simnett, 1999). Another space-weather phenmenon produced by the Sun are 
the solar winds. The solar winds are also particles ejected from the Sun. These streams of 
hot particles, usually contained within the Sun’s corona due to the strong magnetic field 
produced by the Sun, escape at two speeds: either fast or slow. Fast solar winds are 
typically believed to escape from the polar regions of the Sun, where the lines of 
magnetic flux are less organized. Slow solar winds bubble out from regions of the Sun 
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that are typically constrained by the magnetic flux fields such as at the Sun’s equator 
(Glanz, 1997). Both solar flares and CMEs disperse solar energetic particles (SEP), 
capable of disrupting or even damaging electronics in space (Space Studies Board, 2008). 
All three of these solar conditions could jeopardize the safety of a commercial space 
launch; better observation and forecasting techniques must be developed (Trekoff, 2010). 
 Technology. Many technologies exist to measure the phenomena that can 
negatively impact the commercial space launch industry. A detailed analysis has been 
assembled in Appendix A analyzing many of the technologies used in gathering data in 
the aviation and space launch industries. This analysis includes relative accuracy, which 
accounts for both the ability to observe the phenomena and detail in which the equipment 
can measure the phenomena. For example, when examining precipitation-measuring 
technologies, a standard sensor on an ASOS unit can measure the amount of rain or snow 
falling at a single point relatively well. However, the ASOS measurement is the 
precipitation at a single point (FAA, 2008), whereas a Doppler radar unit, such as those 
used by the NWS, may not be able to measure precipitation to the tenth of an inch, but it 
can measure precipitation falling over a large area (124 to 248 nautical miles, depending 
on the observation mode the radar is in) and consecutive images can convey the 
movement and development/dissipation of the precipitation (FAA, 2010). Aircraft 
observation can provide accurate precipitation indications for its flight path, but does 
have some drawbacks, including the inability to provide the large-scale observations, 
including storm movement as a radar unit can. This comparison can be seen in Table 2. 
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Table 2 
Technology Analysis for Observing Precipitation 
Equipment 
Relative 
Accuracy 
Relative Cost 
(Over 25 years) 
ACA 
ASOS Moderate Low Moderate 
Doppler Weather Radar High Negligible Very Strong 
Aircraft Observations Moderately High High Weak 
Note. From Appendix A   
 
 
 Many methods exist to measure wind speed and direction, each sensitive to within 
a single knot of wind speed. Table 3 contains an excerpt from the model data from 
Appendix A, specifically the section on wind instrumentation. 
 
 
Table 3  
Technology Analysis for Observing Wind and Turbulence Condition 
Equipment 
Relative 
Accuracy 
Relative Cost 
(Over 25 years) 
ACA 
Instrument Towers High Low Strong 
Sodar/Wind Profiler High Low Strong 
ASOS Anemometer High Low Strong 
Doppler Weather Radar Moderate Negligible Strong 
Upper Air Soundings Moderate Low Moderate 
Aircraft Observations Moderate High Moderate 
Note. From Appendix A 
41 
 
Instrument towers in the network at CCAFS, which have a series of 
measurements over their length, can measure winds at different altitudes throughout the 
range. ASOS units, often using the same instruments as the towers, have similar 
accuracy, and can track the surface winds (Kingwell et al., 1991). Doppler radar can also 
track winds, but only through calculations based on radar reflectivity, and only when 
precipitation is occurring (Warning Decision Training Branch, 2012). Upper air 
soundings, typically free-flying balloons carrying a package of instruments called a 
radiosonde, are often used to track winds at higher altitudes, and more advanced 
technology has made these measurements more sensitive than ever. A drawback to this 
method is that the balloons are fully free-flying and can drift considerably with altitude as 
the balloon’s course is altered by the wind. When a balloon reaches its maximum altitude, 
it may be over 100 kilometers from the point it was released, whereas a rocket launched 
from the same site may only be 4 or 5 kilometers from the launch site (Kingwell et al., 
1991). To address this known deficiency of balloon-borne radiosondes, another wind 
measurement is acquired at CCAFS, collected by wind profilers. These profilers are able 
to collect wind and turbulence data directly over the site, up to an altitude of 
approximately 16 kilometers (52,493 ft.), compared to balloon-based upper air 
measurements that can reach upwards of 20 kilometers (65,000 ft.) (Martner et al., 1993). 
Martner et al. found that profilers were able to collect over 85% of the data with a vertical 
resolution, or data spacing, of approximately 200 meters (650 ft.).  
The ability to forecast these phenomena are important to making launch decisions 
as well. For many of the phenomena, such as temperature, precipitation, cloud ceilings, 
and visibility, forecast accuracy is high. A forecast verification performed on the 2003-
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2004 winter season for a difficult area of terrain by the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) found temperature forecast accuracy to be within 3 
degrees Celsius for forecast periods of 48 hours or less (Myrick & Horel, 2006). Myrick 
and Horel found wind speed and temperature to be similarly accurate. Forecasts for other 
weather phenomena are less reliable. Two phenomena currently difficult to forecast, but 
essential to the commercial space industry, are lightning and space weather. 
No current products exist that are approved to predict lightning for aviation. 
Walterscheid (2010) presented evidence that correlates lightning prediction to an icing 
prediction product, the Current Icing Product (CIP), an experimental product designed to 
forecast icing probability and intensity. However, as lightning data is used in the CIP to 
predict icing associated with convective activity, it may be found that this correlation is 
not causation. Statistical models have been created in an attempt to forecast probability of 
cloud-to-ground lightning (Shafer & Fuelberg, 2008). The model created by Shafer and 
Fuelberg was shown to be reliable for a number of summer seasons in Florida, though 
this model and others like it are unable to predict cloud-to-cloud lightning or a charged 
atmosphere in which triggered lightning could be produced. 
Forecasting space weather events is in its infancy; although recent research has 
been conducted that may increase our capability to predict solar events (Strong, Saba, & 
Kucera, 2012). Coordinated interagency attention on improving the forecasting of space 
weather events began in 1994 in the US due to the increasing impact of these events on 
aviation and other industries (Fisher, 2003). Our current ability to forecast is primarily 
limited to the solar cycle and data observed from the Sun (Strong et al., 2012). Magnetic 
activity in the Sun follows a cycle that is approximately 22 years in length, with 11 years 
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between each solar maximum (Strong et al., 2012). Figure 4 shows solar activity, 
identified by the number of sunspots visible, for the last 2.5 full solar cycles (Strong et 
al., 2012). Knowledge of this cycle provides forecasters with a general idea of the 
likelihood of a space weather event impacting Earth. Observing solar events from 
satellite and solar observatories allows very short-term forecasting, or more correctly, the 
data from these systems can calculate the arrival time of solar events from their time of 
occurrence to the time of impact on Earth (Strong et al., 2012).  
 
 
 
 Resource structure.  The Resource Structure of Lanicci’s Strategic Planning 
Model is used to analyze the relative cost for the technology, the ACA, the resources a 
Figure 1. Solar activity, 1954-2011. Note. From Strong et al., 2012. 
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company would need to use this technology, national coverage of the technology, and the 
likelihood of national coverage existing in the near future. 
The second set of data from the model is located in Appendix B. This appendix 
contains information regarding the resources a company must have access to, in order to 
utilize the different technologies discussed in this study. It also contains information 
regarding whether or not a company building a new spaceport would likely have 
coverage from the current products nationally, and the likelihood of this coverage 
extending to cover a spaceport if coverage does not already exist.  
A company’s resource needs are a subjective measure, based upon the amount of 
processing needed on the data gathered by a particular technology. Other needs include 
maintenance for new equipment, aircraft cost, operations and maintenance, and satellite 
operations. These specific costs are not estimated due to the high variability in each of 
those services. While these needs are important considerations, a small company might 
not have the capacity to conduct larger operations, such as aircraft observations or solar 
observatory operations. 
National coverage and national likelihood are based upon the availability of data 
for a random location in the US to have coverage. For example, ASOS coverage is 
possible at launch site locations, as many of the current launch sites are associated with 
airports. The likelihood of an ASOS being set up at a new spaceport is low, and only 
likely to occur if traffic at the spaceport becomes high. Doppler radar coverage is 
common at most places in the continental US, but if a company were to set up its 
operations where coverage was unavailable, it is unlikely a new radar site would be 
created to accommodate the facility due to the expense of purchasing, installing, and 
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maintaining a new radar facility. For upper air soundings, a national launch network 
exists, but if a company is in need of accurate wind speeds, the data may be too far away 
to accommodate their launches, and it would be unlikely that the NWS would set up a 
new balloon launch site to improve coverage. 
For lightning data in particular, changes to national coverage are not likely to 
occur. Presently, lightning data is available nationally from commercial vendors who 
contract with the NWS to provide the data (Krider & Koshak, 2003), but real-time data 
from these contractors costs money. The development of this network stemmed from the 
federal government not funding a NWS project to create a network as they have with 
other data sources such as upper air soundings and radar (Orville & Huffines, 2001). One 
issue with public lightning networks is related to the nature of the lightning they sense. 
Networks like Vaisala’s National Lightning Data Network (NLDN) and WSI’s United 
States Precision Lightning Network (USPLN) rely on time-of-arrival (TOA) sensors and 
magnetic direction finding (MDF), which record the radio signals produced by lightning 
strikes, and triangulates their location with other sensors on the network (Vaisala, 2011; 
WSI, n.d.). Due to the need for triangulation when using TOA and MDF sensors, some 
cloud-to-cloud lightning events are not recorded, since the TOA and MDF sensors 
receive conflicting data indicating the source of the strike in multiple locations 
horizontally (Krider & Koshak, 2003). This means that some data potentially vital to the 
commercial space industry could be left out of reports. Lightning analysis and forecasting 
is extremely important. Current lightning launch commit criteria are less stringent than 
they were 10 years ago, but the lack of accurate lightning forecasting means that many 
launches must be canceled, to err on the side of safety (McNamara et al., 2009). 
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Presently, lightning is one of the most common meteorological reasons for the scrub of a 
launch, with only upper level winds possibly canceling more flights (Roeder & Madura, 
2004).   
Gap Analyses  
Research Question 1. A gap analysis was conducted to identify if a gap existed 
in meteorological regulations between the commercial aviation industry and the 
commercial space industry. Multiple gaps were found between the regulations. The 
largest gap relates to the responsibility for meteorological data. For aviation, the 
Secretary of Commerce is responsible “to the highest possible degree… observe, 
measure, investigate and study atmospheric phenomena” and make forecasts, and to 
maintain facilities to do so. Their responsibility includes making reports and distributing 
it to people involved in air commerce (Meteorological Services, 2012). The Secretary of 
Commerce uses the NWS and AWC to fulfill these responsibilities. No similar law exists 
to provide these same services to the commercial space industry. Additionally, specific 
meteorological regulations do not exist similar to the Basic VFR Weather Minimums 
(2004), Takeoff and Landing Under IFR (2009), and the weather responsibilities 
discussed in the AIM (FAA, 2012).  
 Research Question 2. A second gap analysis was conducted to identify if a gap 
existed between the meteorological services provided for commercial aviation companies 
and airports and the meteorological services provided for commercial space companies 
and spaceports. It was found that all of the services available to aviation were provided to 
commercial space companies at the present time for launch operations conducted at or 
around current airports. For launch operations that are occurring or will occur at facilities 
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that are not located on a current airfield, nor at KSC, CCAFS, or the Western Range at 
Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, meteorological services would not be equivalent 
to those provided for aviation. Primarily, surface measurements, such as those provided 
by ASOS instruments would not be available. Doppler radar services may not be 
available either, depending on the location of the airport. Kodiak Launch Complex in 
Alaska is an example of a spaceport that needed to purchase its own launch weather 
equipment, as it falls outside of many of the national weather data networks. This launch 
facility is not located within the range of any of the current NWS weather radar sites. It 
was also built as a new facility and did not have access to the equipment typically located 
at commercial airports (FAA, 2011). Other facilities could be set up in areas with 
insufficient data coverage and face a similar need to purchase equipment and plan their 
own meteorological support.  
Additionally, many products and forecasts are created for aviation that can be 
used without changes by the commercial space industry, provided they remain free to 
access as they are presently for aviation. Examples of applicable products include: (a) 
surface analyses to cover the current weather condition from a regional and national basis 
and prognosis charts to provide information on surface conditions over the next 24 hours, 
(b) winds aloft charts, which would provide weighted wind data from across the 
continental US, (c) SIGMETs, which provide forecast information for convective 
activity, turbulence, icing, (d) AIRMETs, which provide forecast information for 
turbulence, icing and weather conditions that may restrict flight tracking and (e) 
METARs/TAFs, for launch facilities co-located at an airport, which provide observed 
and forecast surface data for launch facilities. Additionally, commercial space companies 
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would have access to the same weather radar data and satellite imagery as the aviation 
industry, allowing them to properly gauge precipitation and cloud cover over a 
company’s facilities. 
 Research Question 3. A third gap analysis was conducted to identify if a the 
meteorological products and regulations that are currently in existence are sufficient to 
meet the estimated needs of commercial space operators for safe operations.  
Currently, a majority of the services provided to aviation are available to the 
commercial space launch industry, and those services would serve the commercial space 
launch industry well for measuring the weather phenomena the commercial space 
industry would likely require. Lightning detection is one area where a gap likely exists. 
Presently, a commercial aviation company can access for free all of the meteorological 
information they need to safely conduct a flight, a measure that companies could possibly 
avoid to cut expenses. Commercial launch companies will be forced to purchase some 
required data, specifically lightning data. Additionally, space weather data cannot 
currently be predicted to the level that is necessary to ensure the safety of flight from a 
meteorological standpoint. 
By law, the meteorological products and basic services provided to aviation are 
guaranteed to be provided (Meteorological Services, 2012). A similar guarantee does not 
exist for the commercial space industry, therefore a gap exists. Finally, as wording for 
most meteorological regulations is on par with that of the aviation industry, a gap was not 
found between current and necessary regulations.  
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Chapter V 
Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
The purpose of this study was to identify the gaps between the aviation and the 
commercial space industries regarding meteorological regulations, services, and products 
in order to estimate the meteorological needs of the commercial space industry. The 
results support the hypothesis that gaps do exist between the aviation and commercial 
space industries. 
Discussion 
A noteworthy gap was identified between the aviation and commercial space 
industries relating to the legislative requirements for providing meteorological services 
and products. Aviation has relied on these products and services provided free of charge 
by the NWS to observe and predict the weather phenomena crucial to maintaining safe 
operations. Though companies have the option of hiring external meteorological support, 
the option of free data from the NWS is available to them. Commercial space launch 
companies have access to these products and services through the same sources, which 
cover many of the phenomena the commercial space industry required for safe operations 
as well. The federal government is not required to continue providing these products free 
of charge to anyone beyond those engaged in air commerce or air navigation under the 
current laws (Aviation Programs, 2012; National and Commercial Space Programs, 
2010). A budget could be passed that requires the NWS to charge users outside aviation 
for these services, and thus the commercial space industry would no longer be able 
receive this data essential to launch safety. It is possible that, without a legislative 
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change, these same products and services would no longer be available to the commercial 
space industry. 
A gap was also found between regulations for the commercial space industry and 
the aviation industry. This gap related to the Basic VFR Weather Minimums (2004), 
Takeoff and Landing Under IFR (2009), and the weather responsibilities discussed in the 
AIM (FAA, 2012). This gap is not considered to be particularly important. The aviation 
industry, both commercial and private, is sensitive to many of the same weather 
phenomena. The commercial space industry has many different launch vehicles which 
have significantly different vulnerabilities. Specific limitations on launch conditions may 
hinder the commercial space industry more than help it. Commercial space launch 
companies are required to create and submit to the FAA for approval a set of weather 
criteria for the company’s launches as part of the company’s written rule document. This 
process is nearly identical to the process an airline must undergo for approval of the 
weather minimums in their standard operating procedures.  It was therefore deemed that 
no changes need to be made based upon this gap. 
An additional gap was found to be possible concerning available surface 
meteorological data available if a newly established launch facility was not co-located at 
an airport or on a federal launch range. This gap specifically deals with the availability of 
meteorological equipment and data coverage. Specifically, radar coverage does not cover 
every possible launch location within the US. This is illustrated at Kodiak Launch 
Complex in Alaska, where coverage from the NWS Doppler radar site in Anchorage does 
not extend to cover the facility. Kodiak Launch Complex was the first newly established 
launch facility within the US, and had to set up many of the technologies necessary to 
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adequately observe weather at their location, including field mills to detect lightning and 
charge build up, surface analysis for phenomena such as wind, temperature and cloud 
ceiling, and a commercial weather radar unit (Sardonia & Madura, 2002). While some 
companies may have enough money to buy this costly equipment; if the federal 
government does not require or provide this equipment at approved spaceports, 
companies may purchase only the most essential equipment to reduce costs.  
Many weather products are produced for aviation, providing a multi-tiered 
approach to analyze and forecast weather phenomena. The second gap analysis found 
many products produced for aviation were sufficient to cover the needs of the 
commercial space industry. The products discussed above, as well as many other 
products created by the NWS, report and predict phenomena in sufficient detail to be 
used for the commercial space industry, and are currently available to commercial space 
companies. This means that, should the NWS be given the same responsibility to the 
commercial space industry as the aviation industry, NWS would need to make few 
modifications to serve the commercial space industry. Instead of another agency making 
duplicate products for the commercial space industry, the funding could go to the NWS 
to research methods of forecasting the phenomena the commercial space industry needs, 
where no products exist. 
Additional products that are needed for the commercial space industry include 
products forecasting lightning potential, electrical charge, and a longer-range forecast of 
space weather events. These products do not exist primarily because there is not 
sufficient data to model these phenomena. Research should be conducted to provide more 
advanced warning for these phenomena. 
52 
 
Conclusions 
 The FAA is responsible for the safety of both the aviation industry and the 
commercial space industry. Having evolved from the CAA, and presiding over the 
regulatory changes related to aviation meteorology, the FAA has institutional memory of 
the challenges that weather provided the early aviation industry. The adaptation of 
aviation meteorological regulations to the commercial space industry was apparent in the 
review of many current meteorological regulations for the commercial space industry, 
and thus, gaps were still identified.  
Additionally, due to the high cost of space launch operations, the federal 
government has been the primary launch operator for the first 60 years of space launch. 
Their operational dominance has provided them sufficient time to identify weather 
conditions that need special consideration for the space launch industry, similar to 
accidents in aviation in the 1980’s highlighting the need for windshear measurements in 
aviation, to cite one example. Though tragic, the accidents suffered by NASA, the U.S. 
Air Force, and JAXA resulted in the creation of a framework for identifying the weather 
conditions that are particularly important during the launch of a spacecraft.  
Overall, the commercial space industry benefits from the federal meteorological 
regulations. More research and support is needed for observing and forecasting both 
lightning and space weather events, though products currently produced for the aviation 
industry cover the remainder of the critical weather phenomena for the commercial space 
industry. Legislative changes should be made to ensure the NWS will continue to provide 
these products to the commercial space industry, in much the same way as they do for 
commercial aviation.  
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Recommendations 
 Based upon the results, recommendations are appropriate for the FAA, the U.S. 
Congress and commercial space launch companies. Additionally, meteorological topics 
that could benefit from future study are discussed. 
 Recommendations to the FAA. The primary recommendations to the FAA relate 
to areas that need continuing research. The current ability to forecast lightning may be 
adequate for aviation, but to ensure launch safety for the commercial space industry, 
more research needs to be conducted on methods of predicting lightning potential. 
Additional research should also be conducted on the ability to forecast the conditions 
necessary for triggered lightning to occur, perhaps through the use of products derived 
from  high-resolution numerical weather prediction models. Such research is needed 
because so little investigation has been conducted on this subject. Further work on the 
cessation of favorable lightning conditions is also needed. 
Another aspect of meteorology that needs continued research is space weather 
forecasting. To make rational launch decisions, companies require more than a three day 
notice on the general likelihood of solar activity. Research should be conducted in an 
attempt to extend the forecast window beyond three days and to make forecast as specific 
as possible.  
Instrument packages should also be deployed to approved commercial spaceports 
as is done at major airports. In addition to a typical ASOS unit, which would be necessary 
for gathering surface data, a small network of field mills could gather the necessary data 
for commercial space launch operators to make evaluate the likelihood of lightning, 
natural or triggered, during a launch. Having this equipment available would allow 
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commercial space launch companies to make better decisions using more accurate 
information on relevant atmospheric phenomenon. 
 Legislative recommendations. To ensure comprehensive weather support is 
available to the commercial space industry, it is recommended that the U.S. Congress 
pursue a legislative change to either: (a) amend the section of U.S. code under Aviation 
Programs (2012) entitled Meteorological Services (2012) to replace “air commerce” with  
“air and space commerce” each time “air commerce” is mentioned and replace “air 
navigation” with “air navigation and space launch” each time “air navigation” is mention, 
or change “air commerce” and “air navigation” to “operations under this title”, or (b) 
amend U.S. Code entitled National and Commercial Space Programs (2010) to include a 
weather commitment similar to the U.S. code Aviation Programs (2012) section entitled 
Meteorological Services (2012). 
Recommendations to commercial space launch companies. To enhance the 
safety of the commercial launch programs, this study makes two recommendations. The 
first recommendation is for companies that are not co-located at an existing launch range 
to deploy weather instruments around launch facilities, regardless of support from the 
FAA and NWS.  Field mills are particularly important at sites supporting vertical 
launches, to ensure no launches are conducted into an environment that could produce 
triggered lightning. The second recommendation is to make use of the meteorological 
products currently employed for the aviation industry. Utilizing these well-tested 
products limits expenses associated with analyzing and forecasting weather with products 
that provide duplicate data, which would allow more resources for analyzing phenomena 
that are not adequately covered nationally, such as lightning.  
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Further research. With the appropriate data and support from a commercial 
space launch company, it is believed that Lanicci’s Strategic Planning Model can be 
applied to an individual company to ensure its meteorology department or service has the 
necessary capabilities to observe and predict the phenomena necessary to make 
appropriate launch decisions. Such an analysis was beyond the scope of this study.  
This study concentrated on launch operations of the commercial space industry. 
Lanicci’s Strategic Planning Model additionally could be used to analyze ground 
operations as well.  
This study limited its review of the regulation of the commercial space industry to 
those regulations pertaining to meteorology. A review of the remaining regulations of the 
commercial space industry may also prove beneficial. 
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Appendix A 
Functional Analysis and Planning: Technology Analysis 
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 Notes: Table include options for companies to install facilities that provide information 
publicly and nationally in parentheses. 
a
ASOS precipitation is measured at a single point, 
so accuracy is not comparable to Doppler radar measurements. 
b
Human observation 
accuracy varies greatly with level of experience and skill. 
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Appendix B 
Functional Analysis and Planning: Resource Structure Analysis 
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Notes: 
a
Met. in this category, is short for meteorology. A/C stands for Aircraft. Satellite 
Operations would also need larger meteorology departments to process the data, as would 
solar observatories and Doppler radar sites. Estimates are based upon the amount of data 
that would need human involvement in processing. 
b
If a spaceport is established at a 
location that is not already an airport, the likelihood of the FAA, NWS, or DoD setting up 
an automated weather station is unlikely. 
 
 
